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Free and Fair Elections, Violence and Conflict
Muna Ndulo* and Sara Lulo**
I. INTRODUCTION
Elections are a defining characteristic of democracy, and thus form an integral
part of the democratization process. Over the past decade, electoral systems and
processes have become a centerpiece of UN peacekeeping missions and post-conflict
democratization projects undertaken by intergovernmental organizations and donor
agencies such as World Bank and USAID. The emphasis on elections as an element
of UN peacekeeping missions is linked to a shift in focus to state rebuilding (or state
creation, as was the case in East Timor).1 Elections thus provide a means for “jump* LL.B. (Zambia), LL.M. (Harvard Law School), D. Phil (Oxford University); Professor of
Law Cornell Law School, Director Cornell University’s Institute for African Development and
Honorary Professor University of Cape Town. Muna Ndulo has extensive experience in postconflict elections, including working on elections in South Africa, East Timor, Afghanistan
and Kosovo.
** B.A. (Cornell University), M.A. (New York University), J.D. and LL.M. (Cornell Law
School), Executive Director Avon Global Center for Women and Justice, Cornell Law School.
Ms. Lulo has served as an election monitor in Dominican Republic.
1 Benjamin Reilly, Elections in Post-Conflict Societies, in THE UN ROLE IN PROMOTING
DEMOCRACY: BETWEEN IDEALS AND REALITY 113, 113 (Edward Newman & Roland Rich,
eds.) (2004) [hereinafter Reilly, Elections in Post-Conflict Societies].
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starting a new, post-conflict political order; for stimulating the development of
democratic politics; for choosing representatives; for forming governments; and for
conferring legitimacy upon the new political order.”2
Recent election-related violence in countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Kenya,
and Zimbabwe have led some to question whether elections reduce the risk of
conflict and in fact lead to stability, democracy, peace and development. For example,
Havard Hegre and Hanne Fjelde have recently argued that there is no evidence that
post-war elections reduce conflict in the short term, but rather that electoral processes
are associated with heightened risk of civil war.3 Such violence is often attributed to a
lack of “security” before elections take place. There is thus an arguably growing view
that security should be the dispositive pre-requisite for the organization of postconflict elections.4
Although it is true that post-conflict elections have resulted in violence in some
countries, it is important to keep in mind that this scenario is not the whole story or
indeed the only story. The experiences of Namibia (1989), Cambodia (1993) South
Africa (1994), Mozambique (1994), El Salvador (1994), East Timor (2001, 2002) and,
in many respects, Sierra Leone (2002), and Liberia (2005) are notable examples of
successful elections held in so-called “fragile” countries.
This Article examines whether elections are a precondition to democratization
and durable peace. We argue that, although elections alone cannot be equated with
democracy, elections indeed are an intrinsic component of the dispensation of
democracy. Further, while security is one factor that is relevant to planning elections
in post-conflict countries, “security” must be considered in the context of a broader
set of challenges and conditions in designing an electoral process capable of achieving
a peaceful transfer of power reflecting the will of the citizenry.
We first consider the central role of elections in the democratization process, and
the corresponding nature of election violence. We then identify some of the key
challenges to holding elections in post-conflict countries, before turning to the
conditions critical to a successful election. Particular attention is given to the
international community’s role in ensuring free and fair post-conflict elections. The
Article concludes by arguing that however “successful” the process, elections must
not be considered a “one-off” initiative or an end in themselves. Sustained attention
is needed to advance not only the establishment of democratic institutions and
processes to ensure good governance, but also the economic development of the
post-conflict country. Thus, while elections undoubtedly require advance planning
and considerable investment of time and money, the achievement of even peaceful

2 Benjamin Reilly, Post-Conflict Elections: Constraints and Dangers, 9 INT’L PEACEKEEPING, 118
(2002).
3 Havard Hegre & Hanne Fjeld, Democratization and Post-Conflict Transitions, in PEACE AND
CONFLICT 2010, 79 (J. Joseph Hewitt, Jonathan Wilkenfeld & Ted Robert Gurr, eds., 2010)
[hereinafter PEACE AND CONFLICT 2010].
4 See, e.g., Wadir Safi, Security and Elections in Afghanistan: Why the Two Must Go Together, NATO
Review (2009), available at http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2009/Afghanistan-law-orderelections/security-elections/EN/index.htm.
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elections will be undermined if the citizenry does not experience an improvement in
the economic conditions that, more often than not, helped spur the conflict in the
first place.
II. INTRINSIC ROLE OF ELECTIONS IN POST-CONFLICT DEMOCRATIZATION
Elections represent an important dimension in the efforts towards democratic
consolidation in any country.5 Stated differently, elections are not synonymous with
democracy, but are a central component of a functioning democratic system.
In discussions of election security and violence, it is relevant to consider the
nature and underlying purpose of election violence. Elections are a contest for
power, and are therefore inherently contentious; unless conducted fairly, they can
(and often do) lead to violence.
Political parties participating in an election use violence, intimidation and conflict
to influence the results or timing of an election.6 This is particularly true when a
particular side perceives the process as unfair or exclusive. As Jeff Fischer rightly
observes, when electoral violence occurs under these circumstances, “it is not a product
of an electoral process; it is the breakdown of an electoral process.”7
The challenge, therefore, is to ensure that elections are fair, credible and
transparent. In the words of Fischer:
[A]n electoral process is an alternative to violence as a means of
achieving governance. However, when an electoral process is
perceived as unfair, unresponsive or corrupt, its political
legitimacy is compromised and stakeholders are motivated
to go outside the established norms to achieve their political
objectives. Electoral conflict and violence become tactics in political
competition.8
Thus, in the post-conflict context, it is fundamental that the electoral process be
governed by clear and fair rules so that even the losers of the contest can trust that
the rules have been applied justly; otherwise, these actors are more likely to continue
the contest by other (violent) means.
Experience shows that post-conflict elections can—and do—help countries
transition into functioning democracies. In this regard, it is relevant to note the

5 Tawanda Mutasah, Beyond Southern Africa: Electoral Politics and the New Pan-Africanism, in
MEDIA INSTITUTE OF SOUTHERN AFRICA, OUTSIDE THE BALLOT BOX: PRECONDITIONS FOR
ELECTIONS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 2005/2006, 51, 51-52 (Jeanette Minnie, ed., 2006), available
at http://www.comminit.com/en/node/278921.
6 See Jeff Fischer, Electoral Conflict and Violence, 12 ELECTIONS TODAY 6, 6 (2004).
7 Id. (emphases added).
8 Id. (emphases added).
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“success” of several post-conflict elections in advancing the consolidation of
democracy.
Mozambique’s 1994 UN-supervised elections are credited as having played an
important role in the country’s transition from violent conflict to democracy.
Notably, the three elections held in Mozambique since 1994 (i.e., the 1999, 2004 and
2009 elections) have included the participation of multiple political parties. Although
one party has retained control of both the presidency and parliament, the opposition
has meaningfully participated in each of the elections. Karbo and Mutisi argue that
“[t]his persistent contestation and challenge to the incumbency has helped to
consolidate and refine the election process, which has ushered in renewed hopes for
all African countries engulfed in violence and protracted conflicts.”9
Another important example of a successful “fragile state” election is the 1989
UN-supervised elections in Namibia. Indeed, these elections led to the adoption of a
new constitution. For Namibia’s election, the UN developed and applied standards
that moved beyond a relatively narrow and technical view of “free and fair elections,”
which had essentially focused on the voting activity on election day itself.10 The new
consensus of what constitutes “free and fair elections” is broader and more
comprehensive in nature, aiming to ensure that the elections are conducted in a free
environment with administratively fair rules. The most important criteria for a free
and fair election include the following:
(1) the right of all voters to participate in the electoral
process without hindrance; (2) [freedom to campaign for all
political parties]; (3) secrecy of the ballot; (4) reasonable
speed in the counting of ballots; (5) accountability and
openness of the electoral process to the competing parties
and (6) an acceptable electoral law.11
Significantly, since its first free election in 1989, Namibia has successfully held
several subsequent elections.
The historic South African general election of 1994 must also be mentioned.
These elections, the first multi-racial elections in the country, marked the end of
apartheid and the establishment of democratic governance. Special institutions, such
9 Tony Karbo & Martha Mutisi, Post-Conflict Elections and Democracy: A Comparative Analysis of
the Mozambique and Angolan Elections, CONFLICT TRENDS 2006/2, 19, 21 (2006).
10 Through the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations established that
“[e]veryone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through
freely chosen representatives” and that “[t]he will of the people shall be the basis of the
authority of government: this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which
shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free
voting procedures.” Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 21, G.A. Res.
217A(III),U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
11 Muna Ndulo, The United Nations and the Monitoring of National Elections, 23 CORNELL L.
FORUM 13, 15 (1996) (citing to NAT’L DEMOCRATIC INST. FOR INT’L AFFAIRS, NATION
BUILDING: U.N. AND NAMIBIA 26 (1990)).
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as the Transitional Executive Council (TEC), were created to ensure that the
apartheid regime was termed and did not undermine a peaceful transition to
democracy. The TEC, which was established by an act of Parliament in 1993, was
given powers to effectively level the pre-election playing field for all parties
participating in the election. Legal barriers were removed that had constrained the
right to free assembly, thereby facilitating free and open campaigning. Through an
Act of Parliament, the Independent Broadcasting Authority was created to foster
conditions for the operation of free media—an important component of fair
elections. Importantly, an Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) was created to
supervise and manage the election. The IEC comprised 16 members, including
respected South Africans, as well as prominent international figures in the field of
human rights such as Gay McDougall (at that time, with the Lawyers’ Committee for
Human Rights). The success of South Africa’s election process is also owed to a
concerted dedication to voter education and the training of ample election monitors.12
These are but a few of the “success stories” of post-conflict elections helping to
bring about a more democratic environment and lasting peace.
III. CHALLENGES PARTICULAR TO POST-CONFLICT ELECTIONS
As post-conflict elections are part of a broader process of democratic reform,
clearly “ill-timed, badly designed, or poorly run elections can actually undermine the
broader process of democratization”13 and the establishment of peace. For example,
the legitimacy of the recent Afghani elections was undermined by the fact that as
many as 1.5 million of the 6 million votes cast were reported to have been
fraudulent,14 further deepening schisms and leaving the democratization process in
uncertainty.
The choice of post-conflict electoral system is crucial, as it can effectively set the
stage for power-sharing among competing groups (and thereby dissipate electionrelated conflict). Angola’s election of 1992 is illustrative in this regard. The election
was considered flawed, and eventually spiralled into violence. Angola’s “failure” is
largely attributed to poorly-timed, “fast-tracked” elections that did not take into
account country-specific conditions, and failed to provide for the possibility of
power-sharing arrangements.15
Experience has shown that a proportional voting system is generally favourable
for post-conflict countries insofar as such a model allows for “power sharing”; even
those parties with comparatively fewer votes stand to win representation in
government. The proportional voting system aims to correlate the percentage of
12 See, e.g., Nadine Gordimer, Rising to the Ballot: The Quiet, Sacred Success of South Africa’s Voter
Education Crusade, WASH. POST, Apr. 24, 1994.
13 Reilly, supra note 1, at 115 .
14 Richard Lappin, Afghanistan and the Dilemma of Post-Conflict Elections, THE MÉTROPOLITAIN,
Oct. 1, 2009, available at http://www.themetropolitain.ca/articles/view/695.
15 See Karbo & Mutisi, supra note 9, at 20.
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votes cast for groups of candidates with the percentage of legislative seats allocated –
i.e., “proportional representation.” In contrast, a “first-past-the-post” or majoritarian
voting system (such as in the United States) establishes a “winner-take-all” model. In
such cases, the losing party is assured no role to play in the new government, placing
increased pressure (and risk of violence) on the high-stakes election.16 As Angola
illustrated, where there is no stable democracy and opponents are vying for the “only
prize worth having,” it is less likely that the loser will accept the elections results -and it is more likely that violent struggle will ensue.17 For this reason, most postconflict elections organized by the UN in recent years have used some form of
proportional representation (e.g., Namibia in 1989, Nicaragua in 1990, Cambodia in
1993, Mozambique in 1994, Kosovo in 2001, and Sierra Leone in 2002).
The party list proportional system has become the de facto voting system of
choice in UN-managed elections, as the party-list system does not require demarcating
electoral districts (and is therefore considerably simpler to organize from a logistics
standpoint). It is also easier to gauge which areas are violence prone in order to direct
individuals to vote in safer areas. An additional benefit to the party list proportional
system is that more women and minorities tend to be nominated and elected through
this system.18
In any event, it is beyond dispute that elections organized in post-conflict
environments take place in tense and high-risk environments, and are therefore
“fundamentally different from those organised under normal circumstances.”19 Set
against a backdrop of humanitarian and economic crises and the destruction of
(usually already inadequate) infrastructure, post-conflict elections involve steep
challenges. We highlight below some additional key challenges to organizing and
carrying out elections in a country emerging from conflict.
1. WEAK POLITICAL PARTIES
Benjamin Reilly describes political parties as “the key agents of political
articulation, aggregation and representation,” making them “the institution which
impact most directly on the extent to which social cleavages are translated into

16

Cf. Muna Ndulo, The Democratization Process and Structural Adjustment in Africa, 10 IND. J. OF
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 315, 355-57 (2003).
17 See COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM AND GOOD GOVERNANCE IN THE
COMMONWEALTH 62 (John Hatchard, Muna Ndulo & Peter Slinn, eds., 2004) (citing to Ann
Reid, INR Foreign Affairs Brief, Conflict Resolution in Africa: Lessons from Angola (Bureau of
Intelligence and Research, U.S. Dep’t of State, 1993).
18 In the party list system, voters cast ballots for the party list versus individual candidates.
Therefore, provided the party list contains women and minority candidates whose names are
sufficiently prioritized on the list, the party list system guards against voter bias against and
reluctance to vote for individual women and minority candidates.
19 Karbo & Mutisi, supra note 9, at 20.
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national politics.”20 Indeed, obstacles and problems in democratic transition originate
in the weaknesses of the political parties in a post-conflict society. The parties are
structurally weak, and they typically lack orientation, focus or ideology. Often the
parties are based on individuals or ethnic divides21 rather than a clear program, leaving
voters with the unappealing choice between the “devil they know” and the possiblyworse “unknown.”
In recent years, international election-related efforts have rightly dedicated greater
attention to supporting the capacity-building of political parties as credible institutions
to participate in the democratic political system. The danger of failing to develop
legitimate political parties is reflected in Angola’s 1992 elections. There the 18-month
election window following the Bicesse accords “did not offer adequate time for
building a party machinery that was capable of offering a credible challenge to the
incumbent [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)] government,
which had the control of the state and its institutions including the electoral
commission.”22 The experience of El Salvador stands in contrast in this regard, with
the two current major political parties—the Nationalist Republican Alliance
(ARENA) and Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN)—transforming
themselves from their military roots during the country’s civil war to viable political
parties after the peace agreement in 1992.
Particularly in cases of weak civil society, “political parties are the key link
between masses and elites,” with political parties playing “a crucial role in building a
sustainable democratic polity.”23 In short, a robust democratic system depends largely
on the institutional strength and capacity of political parties. Without legitimate
participants in the post-conflict political sphere, there will be no credible contest.
2. WEAK GOVERNANCE AND INSTITUTIONS
On a related point, most post-conflict governments suffer from institutional
weaknesses beyond political party limitations. This is particularly true in developing
countries that have lacked the opportunity and resources to establish a legacy of
democratic institutions and good governance. Too often there is reliance on highly
personalized and centralized systems of governance in which corruption is rampant
and civil servants are inadequately trained for their respective offices. In such
circumstances, there is a general lack of accountability at all levels of government.
In terms of political systems, a separation of powers and a system of “checks and
balances” is not engrained; to the contrary, a confusion of power reigns among the
20

See Benjamin Reilly, Post-War Elections: Uncertain Turning Points of Transition, in FROM WAR
157, 177 (Anna K. Jarstad & Timothy D.
Sisk, eds., 2008).
21 See id. at 178 (“In post-war situations, party politics tend to reflect the social cleavages
which created the conflict in the first place. If the conflict had a strong ethnic dimension, for
instance, then these will tend to be reflected in the new democratic system, particularly if
‘ethnic parties’ are allowed to form freely.”).
22 Karbo & Mutisi, supra note 9, at 20.
23 Reilly, Elections in Post-Conflict Societies, supra note 1, at 114.
TO DEMOCRACY: DILEMMAS OF PEACEBUILDING
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executive, legislature and judicial branches of government. There may also be
outright resistance to democratic elections coming from within the government in
power. Such factors make it difficult for elections, let alone longer-term democratic
processes, to take root and function properly. Thus, the absence of institutional
support or effective governance adds a layer of difficulty to post-conflict elections.
3. ABSENCE OF DEMOCRATIC CULTURE AND POLITICAL TOLERANCE
Free and fair elections can be held only where there exists an environment which
seeks to provide popular participation, promotes human rights and guarantees
fundamental freedoms, ensures accountability of the government, freedom of the
judiciary, freedom of the press, and protects and respects political pluralism.
Typically, none of these conditions exist in a post-conflict country. As a result, the
operating environment is one of suspicion and distrust, both at the governmental
level and among the popular masses, which, particularly in developing countries, can
be largely uneducated and/or illiterate. At the governmental level, there is a general
lack of a sense of state accountability (as well as the lack of individual accountability,
noted above); more common is political violence, high levels of intimidation and bias.
In turn, there is widespread suspicion and little or no confidence in the governmental
system. Such perceptions also stem from previous election experiences that were
marred by violence and serious electoral irregularities, as well as the exclusion of
marginalized groups. This absence of an underlying democratic culture poses a
serious problem in conflict countries, and underscores the need for an inclusive
electoral process, voter education and measures to build confidence in the electoral
system.
4. DEMOBILIZATION
Demobilization of warring factions should precede a post-conflict election, and
presents a worthwhile and necessary component of post-conflict efforts to increase
security and decrease the risk of the resumption or re-escalation of fighting. For
example, some credit the peaceful execution of the 1994 Mozambique election at least
in part to a successful demobilization program.24
The demobilization process should be treated as providing opportunities for
institutions of war (such as the army and militias) to begin their transformation into
legitimate political actors and structures that can support democratization.
Alternatively, if the institutions of war are not transformed and demobilized, they
pose a threat to the electoral bodies insofar as they retain the capacity to undermine
security and intimidate opposing parties and voters.
Without discounting the importance of demobilization efforts, it is necessary to
be cognizant of the limits of such efforts. In the context of long-standing mistrust
among warring factions, where a measure of power and survival—in the political and
personal sense—has been predicated on the carrying of arms, it is unrealistic to
24

See Karbo & Mutisi, supra note 9, at 19-20, 23.
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assume that demobilization will be quickly forthcoming and absolute. Soldiers may
be offered incentives such as money, land or job training in exchange for surrendering
their weapons and thus “demobilizing.” Experience demonstrates that it is typical for
previously warring factions to gradually “test” the process and the other side’s good
faith before making a meaningful commitment to demobilization; commanders will
be inclined to protect their readiness to fight in the event the demobilization process
fails.25 For example, it is unlikely (and should not be assumed) that, particularly at the
early stages of demobilization, the weapons surrendered will be the most critical or
those of best quality; rather, commanders will direct soldiers to “demobilize” by first
giving up the least important and oldest weapons in their cadre. In other words, even
as the demobilization process is underway, the warring factions remain armed to some
degree. Effective demobilization is thus dependent on confidence that there will be a
fair transfer of power through democratic elections, and that one’s respective “side”
will have an opportunity to, at minimum, fairly compete for a role in the new
government.
Individual cooperation with demobilization is further hampered by severe
economic constraints and rampant unemployment. For many if not most militia or
guerrilla group members involved with internal conflicts, identification with a warring
faction is the only means for securing an income (whether or not the income
comprises “legitimate” wages or simply spoils taken by force). Demobilization efforts
should therefore include a means of identifying and training soldiers suitable for
employment in a new representative national army. This integration process entails
devising appropriate criteria and assessment methodologies, and training and
integration itself. In a broader sense, the link between unemployment and reticence
to demobilize highlights the need for economic development to create alternative
forms of employment and reduce the risk of (i.e., perceived need for) violence.
5. INEFFECTIVE LOCAL FORCE
A somewhat related challenge is the need for a functioning and effective police
force in a post-conflict country. The presence and role of local police forces can
impact not only the general security situation, but also the conduct of the election
itself. Among other functions, police are needed to guard ballot boxes, guard election
materials and maintain order and security at public meetings, campaign events and
polling stations.
As Andrew Graham observes,“[t]he electoral process is one that is governed by
public policy and can only succeed with independent oversight of the process that
establishe[s] credibility with the population. Police serve a supportive role to that

25 See generally Kimberly Mahling Clark, USAID, DocID: PN-ABY-027, Fostering a Farewell to
Arms: Preliminary Lessons Learned in the Demobilization and Reintegration of Combatants, 9 (1996)
(describing various challenges in demobilization efforts, including vigilantism and banditry).
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independent oversight.”26 However, in most conflict countries, the police and the
army have proven themselves partial in their approach to policing, and are often used
by the ruling government as a resource to frustrate free political activity and even
intimidate voters.27 In short, the domestic police force in a post-conflict country
typically does not inspire confidence in the people. Distrust is heightened by an
institutional culture that tolerates a profound disrespect for human rights. In such
cases, local police are an unsuitable presence for guarding the polling stations and
performing other election-related functions such as transporting ballot papers without
supervision.
Because distrusted and/or inadequately trained local police forces can add further
roadblocks to elections and even interfere with the electoral process, planning should
include appropriate police training supplemented with UN civilian police as necessary.
At a practical level, police training should be multi-dimensional, comprising both
written materials and interactive “face-to-face” training from superiors or front-line
officers and, at a minimum, cover the nature of the electoral legislation and an
overview of the electoral process, human rights issues in relation to the police’s role,
standards of police conduct and communication mechanisms between the police
forces and the electoral commission.28 Further, the role of the police force must be
clearly defined—for the benefit of the forces themselves and the public—for each of
the different phases of the electoral process (pre-election, election day and postelection).
6. LOGISTICAL CONCERNS
One of the most vexing challenges of organizing post-conflict elections is the
degree of logistical planning involved, and the lack of basic infrastructure to facilitate
seemingly simple tasks. It must be borne in mind that, in a country emerging from
conflict, infrastructure has typically been ravaged by fighting and destruction, and
resources are in short supply. This creates enormous practical and logistical hurdles
that make elections difficult and cumbersome to organize and carry out. These
factors require special consideration and extensive advance planning.
For example, the condition and security of roadways and the availability of
adequate transport/vehicles must be assessed for, among other things, the secure
transportation of ballot boxes—both to polling stations prior to voting, and to the
electoral commission (or other appropriate location) for counting the ballots after
votes are cast. In some cases air transportation might be the only safe way to
26

Andrew Graham, Preparing Police Services in Democratic Regimes to Support the Electoral Process:
A Survey of Leading Practice 14 (Ukraine Proj., Sch. of Pol’y Stud., Queens Univ., 2006), available
at http://aceproject.org/ero-en/topics/elections-security/police-forces-in-elections.doc.
27 Final Report of the United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa (UNOMSA) to the
United Nations Secretary-General, A Democratic, Non-Racial and United South Africa (May 26,
1994), 12 [hereinafter 1994 UNOMSA Report].
28 Id. at 18, 20-21. See also generally id. (setting forth an overall model of how local police
should be involved with the electoral process and describing best practices in transitional
societies, including Macedonia, Nigeria, Azerbaijan and South Africa).
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transport election materials, including ballot boxes, particularly to and from very
remote areas that are often not reachable by road.
Road conditions also impact the ease of transport for monitors to travel among
polling stations on election day and, of crucial importance, voters’ ability to reach
polling stations. It likewise bears emphasizing that women voter turnout can be
disproportionately impacted by mobility and related security concerns. It is well
documented that rape and other crimes targeted at women are pervasive during
conflict and post-conflict times, and even as a tactic to terrorize voters.29 Safety
concerns should factor into the placement of and distance between polling stations, as
well as the scheduling of voting hours. (For example, travel during evening hours,
particularly when power outages are frequent, can pose additional risks, if not simply
disincentive, to travel even short distances in order to vote.)
Beyond infrastructure and transport, logistical planning must take into account
and adapt to unreliable telecommunication services and the lack of local availability of
basic office supplies, two key factors that can frustrate day-to-day operations of the
electoral planning process, let alone the management of election day. Advance
planning must also factor in proper warehousing facilities for critical election
materials.
The above is a brief and far-from-exhaustive list of practical elements that should
be considered on a country-specific basis as part of the election planning process.
The underlying point is that the most basic amenities should not be taken for granted
in a post-conflict setting; logistical planning requires attention, time and knowledge of
local conditions. It also requires flexibility and adaptability.
IV. CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESSFUL ELECTORAL PROCESS
Having pointed out challenges particular to elections in the post-conflict context,
we turn to describing certain points that should form key components of the election
planning process.
It warrants mention that post-conflict elections should not be judged solely by the
standards of well-established democracies. Such an approach would ignore the
situation on the ground and a core strategic purpose of post-conflict elections: to
induce warring parties to stop fighting and agree to a non-violent resolution of the
conflict. In this regard, the bar should not be set unreasonably too high for judging
the “success” of a post-conflict election. A key factor to be considered is whether the
results of the election, overall, reflect the will of the people, and whether the election
advances the peace process and the establishment of democratic dispensation. In the
29 See, e.g., AIDS-FREE WORLD, ELECTING TO RAPE: SEXUAL TERROR IN MUGABE’S
ZIMBABWE (2009), available at http://www.aids-freeworld.org/images/stories/Zimbabwe/
zim%20grid%20screenversionfinal.pdf (documenting systematic and widespread rape in
connection with the 2008 election and specifically aimed at terrorizing the political opposition;
according to the report, all the women targeted were members of the opposition party
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC)).
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1994 South African elections because there were some logistical and administrative
problems observed in parts of the country especially in Natal, the UN Observer
Mission, the European Union (EU) Mission, The Commonwealth Observer Missions
and the Organization of African Unity Observer Mission in the joint verdict agreed to
use term: “the election reflected the will of the people” rather than the term “free and
fair.” 30
What constitutes a “successful” election has changed over time—and certainly
depends on the circumstances of the country. For example, some hold the view that
“[i]n Sudan, the logistical and political barriers to the elections even happening are so
high that having the election happen at all, and in a way that does not jeopardize the
fragile peace, would be an achievement.”31 There is, however, a case to be made that
in a country like Sudan, in the midst of an ongoing conflict and genocide in Darfur,
conditions do not exist to hold elections; any such elections cannot advance peace or
lead to the establishment of democratic governance, and instead are likely to be used
by the Bashir regime in an effort to legitimize itself. The example of Sudan can be
contrasted with Mozambique and Cambodia, “where elections are increasingly
becoming a test of the maturity of the broader political environment and of the
openness of elites to change, [and] a more demanding standard [for elections] is
increasingly expected.”32
As discussed above, the consolidation of peace often depends on the election
of a government freely chosen by the people and can be impacted by the voting
system that is selected. Regardless of whether the voting system follows the
proportional representation or majoritarian model, there is an absolute need to ensure
that the elections are—and are perceived to be—free and fair. Much will turn on the
design and implementation of an electoral process that takes into account countryspecific history and factors (e.g., potential ethnic divisions and the nature of the
conflict), and which maximizes the transparency and security at all stages of the
electoral process, including pre-election planning and administration, and certification
of the results.
Election planners should keep in mind that previous elections in a post-conflict
country typically would have been characterized by selective voter registration,
intimidation and gerrymandering of electoral districts. There may be limited or no
local experience in running an election that emphasizes the freedom of voters to make
their choice freely and in secrecy.33
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The goal in any election is thus to create a secure, level playing field for voters
and candidates, as well as to provide voter education and civic involvement
throughout the electoral process and translate the will of the people into a
representative government. At the core of its purpose, the electoral process must be
accessible to all citizens—irrespective of where they live and their political
affiliations—and with respect to universal registration and access to polling stations.
Likewise, a truly democratic election is predicated on political candidates themselves
having a level playing field for campaigning; candidates should have access to all
communities and not be limited by de facto “no-go zones.” The existence of an
uneven playing field—for either voters or candidates—runs contrary to the spirit and
reality of fair elections.
To foster conditions conducive to such a level playing field, election planners
should pay particular attention to establishing (i) an effective electoral framework,
including an independent electoral administration and (ii) a comprehensive plan of
administrative and procedural matters. A useful resource detailing the internationallyrecognized standards has been elaborated by the International Institute for
Democracy and Electoral Assistance.34
1. EFFECTIVE FRAMEWORK AND ELECTORAL ADMINISTRATION
Electoral planning cannot be limited to what happens on election day; effective
election administration requires long-range planning, and efficient and impartial
administrators. If the probability of rigging is to be reduced and the integrity of the
electoral process enhanced, considerable weight must be given to the conditions on
the ground leading up to the elections, not simply concentrating on what transpires
on the voting day.
The Electoral Commission is the key body for administering elections, and
proved central to the success of post-conflict elections in Namibia, Cambodia and
East Timor.35 The Commission must be independent and legitimate in order to act
effectively; if the referee of a contest is perceived to be biased, the result will not be
readily accepted and the losing side feels cheated. By the same token, run-off
elections will work only if people trust in the process and supervising authority. In
the 2009 Afghanistan elections, the first round of the presidential elections were
adjudged to have been riddled with corruption and badly managed; the opposition
refused to contest the run-off elections because the Independent Electoral
Commission was perceived as incapable of conducting a free election.36

34 INT’L INST. FOR DEMOCRACY AND ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE (IDEA), INTERNATIONAL
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TIMES, Nov. 1, 2009, available at
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As guardians of the public trust in the democratic system, it is critical that the
election administrators are impartial. Further, the administrative apparatus should
incorporate the local communities, engage civic participation and include substantial
voter education. 37
2. ADMINISTRATIVE AND PROCEDURAL MATTERS
Insufficient attention to administrative and procedural matters will negatively
impact the organization of a transparent and legitimate election. The significance of
these practical steps should not be underestimated in the post-conflict environment
where, as noted, tension is high and public trust is low. The following administrative
and procedural matters should be prioritized in planning post-conflict elections:
(a) Inspection of the voters roll. The voters roll should be made
available for public inspection to allow for public accountability
and the participation of various stakeholders. Additionally,
public accountability promotes the accuracy and integrity of the
voters roll.
(b) Proper accounting for election materials and equipment. In
many post-conflict elections, distribution of election materials
and equipment is chaotic, leading to accusations of vote-rigging.
Shortage of materials, whether intentional or not, also can lead
to the disenfranchisement of voters.
(c) A transparent process for vote reconciliation. Typically, ballot
counting takes place at pre-determined centralized points in each
constituency. However, lack of reconciliation and secrecy in the
counting of votes undermines public confidence in the elections.
Vote counting therefore must be a transparent process. and must
not take place before an accounting of spoiled papers, unused
voting papers, vote registers and all election materials. Many
post-conflict elections see widespread accusations of ballot
boxes mysteriously appearing or disappearing, which,
unsurprisingly, results in allegations of vote rigging and
contesting of the results.
(d) A code of conduct should be implemented for the campaign
period. As discussed, free and fair elections hinge on the
freedom of political parties to campaign for votes. Access to all
areas of the country must be guaranteed. A code of conduct is
important because it emphasizes the fact that political parties
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must share in the responsibility of ensuring the freedom of
others to campaign and canvas for votes.
V. INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN POST-CONFLICT ELECTIONS
International involvement has proven invaluable in navigating and overseeing the
logistical hurdles noted above. International support is crucial to planning and
conducting post-conflict elections because conflict countries typically lack the
necessary domestic resources and personnel required to conduct a free and fair
election. For the international community, post-conflict elections are also an
important signal that legitimate democratic authority has been returned (or instituted)
in a country, and that the on-the-ground presence of the international community
may be coming to an end. Donor nations therefore seek evidence of concrete steps
towards the establishment of a capable state as part of their “exit strategy.”38
To create the foundation for lasting democracy, international support should
focus on supporting and building capacity within key institutions such as the electoral
commission and local police forces. International involvement is likewise important
to plan and oversee the electoral process, and lend economic assistance and expertise
to further the development of sound electoral laws and processes. This is particularly
relevant in situations of state creation such as East Timor, where there is no history or
legacy of pre-conflict democratic governance.
Election monitoring (including through providing international monitors and
training local monitors) is another crucial way for the international community to
ensure and support free and fair elections. A distinct concern relating to international
involvement is to avoid legitimizing a flawed election. This concern underscores the
importance of effective monitoring throughout the entire electoral process.
Monitoring activity should cover—geographically and chronologically—the entire
electoral process, from the initial stages of registration through the elections
themselves.39 To minimize the chance of a disputed outcome,40 each of the election
stages (i.e., voter registration, campaigning, printing of election materials, storage and
transportation of election materials, casting and counting ballots) should be certified
as compliant with the principles of a free and fair election before proceeding to the
next stage. Otherwise, the international observation exercise will be superficial and its
conclusions vague or empirically untenable.
International observation thus requires the oversight of the actions of the
Electoral Commission and its organs at all stages of the electoral process to verify
compatibility under the governing legislation, the extent of freedom of assembly,
expression and organization, voter education efforts, access to media by all political
parties, registration of voters (to ensure, for example, that qualified voters are not
denied identification documents that would allow them to exercise their right to vote),
38
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proper security measures of transport and custody of ballots, and timely
announcement of election results. International consultants should also help create
transparent and speedy dispute resolution mechanisms for claims of irregularities,
fraud and denial of access. Elections always entail such disputes, and it is important
that disputes are settled in a timely manner and a new democracy is equipped with an
impartial and speedy system of electoral dispute settlement.
The training of local monitors is likewise important—and efficient—in achieving
“total observation” that would otherwise extend beyond the reach and capacity (and
funding) of strictly international efforts. For example, local monitors should be
professionally trained and work alongside international monitors, as has been done in
South Africa41 and East Timor.42 In addition to broader geographical coverage at
lower expense, the use of local monitors brings enormous benefits, including greater
understanding of the local language(s) and nuances (including covert forms of
intimidation that might elude international observers). Further, local monitors are an
important way of involving the citizenry with accountability and oversight of their
own election process.
For all these reasons, effective and committed international involvement is crucial
to the success of post-conflict elections and to creating the foundation for a
sustainable democratic system. As a colloquium of African Electoral administrators
observed: “[D]emocratic elections cannot be created by the election law itself, or even
by the electoral authorities alone. Democratic elections and sustainable democracy
are built through a partnership of electoral authorities, political parties, NGOs,
ordinary citizens, and sometimes international support.”43
VI. CONCLUSION
Post-conflict elections are marked by great promise, commensurate with immense
pressure to meet domestic and international expectations. While there may be
competing interests and timeframes in the planning of post-conflict elections, in order
to maximize the potential for the consolidation of peace and democracy, particular
attention should be paid to the practical challenges set forth above, and to the
country-specific context and conditions that further shape such challenges. In
addition, a successful and peaceful post-conflict election requires an effective electoral
framework and a comprehensive plan of administrative and procedural matters.
International resources and expertise can prove critical to post-conflict elections;
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however, international agents should prioritize working with local institutions, leaders
and communities in order to benefit from relevant local expertise, while
simultaneously building local capacity and public accountability.
Importantly, the international community needs to remain engaged long after
polling day and ballot counting. Post-conflict elections must not be viewed by the
international community simply as a “punctuation point” at the end of a conflict.
Developing institutions of governance is complex and takes time. Further, although
international involvement in post-conflict elections is important, such involvement
must be coupled with genuine efforts to jump-start not only the post-conflict political
order, but also the post-conflict economy.
Indeed, the major challenge that post-conflict countries will continue to face after
election day is economic recovery. Regardless of how successful an election may be
run, conditions for conflict will remain ripe if the populace does not see an
improvement in economic conditions. In plain terms, there can be no enduring
democracy in the midst of poverty. Studies show that economic growth, reduction of
unemployment and diversification of the economy are important conditions both for
promoting democratic stability and avoiding the recurrence of conflict.44
Long-term conflict prevention strategies should not disregard the correlation
between armed conflict on the one hand, and poverty and the marginalization of
minority groups on the other.45 In this sense, post-conflict elections should aim “to
promote human rights, to protect minority rights and to institute political
arrangements in which all groups are represented… [e]very group needs to become
concerned that the state belongs to all people.”46 Moreover, elections should be
coupled with concerted plans to stimulate economic growth, enfranchise marginalized
groups and improve the overall population’s standard of living. As Former UN
Secretary-General Kofi Annan has remarked: “[E]very step taken towards reducing
poverty and achieving broad-based economic growth [] is a step toward conflict
prevention.”47 Thus, a genuine commitment to consolidating democracy in postconflict areas does not end with elections – it extends to thoughtful, planned
economic investment in the country’s future and sustained economic development.

44

J. Joseph Hewitt, The Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger: Ranking States on Future Risks, in
PEACE AND CONFLICT 2010 supra note 3, at 7.
45 MILLENNIUM REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL, ‘WE THE PEOPLES’: THE ROLE OF
THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, U.N. Doc. A/54/2000, at ¶ 202
(2000) (remarking that in many cases of internal conflict, “poverty is coupled with sharp or
religious cleavages,” in which minority rights are “insufficiently respected and the institutions
of government are insufficiently inclusive”).
46 Id. at ¶ 204.
47 Id.

